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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff-Appellee, \ 
v • i 
CINDY BLAIR, l 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
t Case No. 920582-CA 
t Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Cindy Blair appeals her conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), a third degree felony, 
entered upon jury verdict, in the Second Judicial District Court, 
in and for Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, 
presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The three issues identified by defendant on appeal can 
be more succinctly addressed under two issues, as follows: 
1. Did the trial court erroneously admit evidence of 
cocaine possession, consisting of items found in defendant's 
garbage can, over defendant's "other bad acts" or "character 
evidence" objection? (Responding to Issue 1 in Br. of 
Appellant). In part, this issue implicates Rule 404, Utah Rules 
of Evidence; Rule 404 admissibility has been held to be a 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
question of law, reviewed without deference to the trial court. 
See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568 (Utah App. 1991). Rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is also involved; a trial court's 
ruling under this provision is reviewed deferentially on appeal, 
for "abuse of discretion." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572. 
2. Did defendant have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of her garbage can, placed curbside for 
collection, such that the warrantless seizure of those contents 
violated her state constitutional protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures? (Issues 2 and 3 in Br. of Appellant). 
Ultimately this question is one of law, reviewed without 
deference to the trial court, addressing whether any privacy 
expectation that defendant might have entertained is also one 
which society is prepared to accept as legitimate. See Taylor, 
818 P.2d at 565-67. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads in pertinent part: 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he 
acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a 
pertinent trait of his character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same; 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident. 
2 
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Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, reads: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges and Pretrial Motions 
Defendant and her husband were charged jointly with 
possession of a controlled substance (R. 20).l The physical 
evidence against them consisted of cocaine residue and apparent 
cocaine paraphernalia seized from the couple's garbage can on 
three occasions, and similar material seized upon a subsequent, 
warrant-supported search of their home (R. 9-10, 12-14). A 
pretrial motion to suppress that evidence under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution was denied (trial court's 
ruling, R. 49-53, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant). 
Objections to the evidence under evidentiary rules were also 
denied (R. 61; T. 25-30). 
*Record citations are to the main record, "R.,H and to the 
transcript of the April 15, 1992 trial, "T." 
3 
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Statement of Facts 
Acting on an informant's tip that defendant and her 
husband were involved in drug sales or use, narcotics 
investigators, on three successive weeks, retrieved the couple's 
garbage, set out for collection on the street in front of their 
home (R. 12-14, 49). In the garbage, the investigators found 
small tinfoil pieces, pipes made from beverage cans, cigarette 
lighters, and burned spoons and ballpoint pen tubes: some of 
these items contained residue that tested positive for cocaine 
(R. 12-14). Upon this information, a circuit court judge issued 
a warrant to search the couple's home (R. 16-17). 
Similar physical evidence was found during the warrant-
supported home search (R. 9-10). Some of that evidence, 
including a white residue that tested positive for cocaine, was 
found in the home's master bedroom (T. 51-52, 101-02). The use 
of the tinfoil, spoons, pen tubes, and so forth for preparing and 
ingesting cocaine was described to the jury at trial (T. 50-56). 
The jury also heard that during the search, defendant commented 
that a picture frame seized in the bedroom had cocaine on it (T. 
84-85); testing proved her comment to be accurate (T. 102-03). 
Finally, the jury heard that near the end of the home search, 
defendant waived her "Miranda" rights and told the searching 
officers "that she wanted some help and that she had been using 
drugs" (T. 57-58). 
4 
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Verdict and Trial Court Disposition 
Upon trial, the jury found defendant guilty of unlawful 
drug possession, but acquitted her husband (R. 57, 119-20). 
Pursuant to the verdict, defendant was sentenced to zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison; this was suspended, and probation 
ordered (R. 132-33). A certificate of probable cause was then 
granted, and the jail time provision of defendant's probation was 
stayed pending the resolution of this appeal (R. 130-31). On 
appeal, defendant reasserts her challenge to the admissibility of 
the physical evidence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that evidence seized from her garbage 
can was inadmissible "other bad acts" or "character" evidence 
fails under settled law. The evidence showed ongoing cocaine use 
in defendant's home, and was therefore relevant to show 
possession and knowledge of such possession, essential elements 
of the charged crime, quite apart from whatever tenuous 
"character" inference might be drawn from it. Because the 
evidence was not offered solely to show defendant's character, 
then, it was admissible. 
This Court should also reject defendant's argument that 
the evidence taken from her garbage can was unconstitutionally 
seized under the Utah Constitution. Federal law is clear that 
citizens have no legitimate privacy expectation in garbage placed 
curbside for collection. This federal principle is neither 
unclear nor inconsistent, and defendant has shown no reason to 
5 
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fashion a different rule under the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the evidence taken from defendant's garbage can was 
admissible, as was other evidence derived from it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT'S GARBAGE 
CAN WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE, FOR IT TENDED TO PROVE AN ELEMENT 
OF THE CHARGED CRIME, AND WAS NOT OFFERED 
SOLELY AS "CHARACTER" EVIDENCE. 
Defendant first argues that the evidence seized from 
her garbage can was improperly admitted under Rules 403, 404, and 
405, Utah Rules of Evidence (Br. of Appellant at 8). She also 
invokes Rule 609 (id,, at 11). Proceeding in roughly reverse 
order, these evidentiary rules do not assist defendant. 
A. Rules 405 and 609, Utah Rules of Evidencer 
Addressing Only "Character," Do Not APPIV. 
By its terms, Rule 405 addresses methods of proving 
character, when character traits are in issue. However, the 
crime of unlawfully possessing controlled substances contains no 
"character" element. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 1992). 
In State v. Sisneros, 581 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1978), the question of 
defendant's general good character was held irrelevant to the 
issue of whether he had committed the charged sexual offense. 
Similarly here, defendant's character, good or bad, has no 
bearing on the question of whether she possessed controlled 
substances. Therefore Rule 405 has no application. 
Rule 609 also is off-point. That rule deals with the 
use of a witness's prior criminal convictions for general 
6 
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impeachment purposes. The cocaine residue and paraphernalia 
found in defendant's garbage do not show a past conviction, by 
"public record" or otherwise. Further, that evidence was not 
used to make defendant out to be a generally dishonest person. 
Instead, it was direct substantive evidence that defendant was in 
fact guilty of the drug possession offense. As such, it was 
properly placed before the jury, to weigh against defendant's 
protestation of innocence. See Sisneros, 581 P.2d at 1342. 
B. The Evidence Was Admissible Under Rule 404 to 
Prove the Intent Element of the Offense. 
Rule 404 generally bars the use of "character evidence" 
to prove that a person "acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion . . .." Once more, it is doubtful that 
evidence of having discarded the contraband said anything to the 
jury about defendant's character. Rather than showing "bad 
character," it could just as well suggest that defendant, as a 
tidy housekeeper, was of "good character." Again, this would not 
necessarily prevent the jury from finding her guilty of unlawful 
drug possession. 
Even assuming that evidence found in her garbage says 
anything about defendant's general character, that evidence was 
admissible under Rule 404. Specifically, Rule 404(b) is an 
"inclusionary" rule. See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 568-70 
(Utah App. 1991). As such, it permits admission of "all evidence 
of other crimes except that evidence that proves only criminal 
disposition." Id., at 568 (emphasis added) (citing 2 J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence § 404[08] (1990)). Thus 
7 
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evidence tending to show "bad character" is admissible if, as 
stated in the rule, it serves "other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 
The evidence of cocaine use in defendant's garbage 
clearly met the inclusionary "other purposes" standard of Rule 
404(b). On the day of the home search, defendant claimed that a 
friend of hers named Wendy "always came over and brought cocaine 
over to the house . . . " (T. 58). This suggested that the 
contraband had found its way into the home not through defendant, 
but passively or accidentally, through her friend. 
The drug possession offense entails a knowing and 
intentional mental state, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a) 
(Supp. 1992). The evidence in defendant's garbage over three 
successive weeks, tending to show repeated, ongoing cocaine use, 
belied the suggestion that defendant's friend, not defendant, was 
the person who knowingly and intentionally brought cocaine into 
the home. Thus the trial court correctly admitted the evidence 
under Rule 404 (T. 30). See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 569-70, and 
cases cited therein. 
Finally, defendant's reliance on State v. Tarafa, 720 
P.2d 1368 (Utah 1986), is misplaced. Tarafa did not involve 
improper admission of "other crimes" evidence. Instead, it 
involved prosecutor misuse of such evidence, actually introduced 
by the defendant. The Tarafa prosecutor repeatedly assailed the 
defendant's character, by stating, for example, "He's a thief 
8 
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with a criminal mind," during closing argument. 720 P.2d at 
1372. That use of the defendant's other crimes, well beyond 
impeachment purposes, was reversible error. Id. 
Here, in contrast, nothing in the prosecutor's closing 
argument (T. 144-48, copied in the addendum to Br. of Appellant) 
resembled an attack on defendant's character. Rather, the 
prosecutor simply argued the conflicting evidence—that is, the 
presence of contraband in and about defendant's home versus 
defendant's disclaimer of responsibility for it. The "other 
crimes" evidence in defendant's garbage, then, was both correctly 
admitted under Rule 404, and properly utilized at trial. 
C. The Evidence Was Properly Admitted Under Rule 403, 
for it Was Not Unfairly Prejudicial. 
While Rule 404 permits admission of "other crimes" 
evidence, the "probative versus prejudicial" weighing of Rule 
403, Utah Rules of Evidence, should also be done. Taylor, 818 
P.2d at 571. To be excluded under Rule 403, the probative value 
of the challenged evidence must be substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. jDd. at 571 
(quoting the rule, emphasis partly in original). Trial courts 
have relatively broad discretion under Rule 403; rulings under it 
are reversed on appeal only if they are "beyond the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 
1992); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572. 
Factors guiding the Rule 403 weighing of other crimes 
evidence include "the similarities between the [past and charged] 
crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
9 
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the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Taylor, 818 
P.2d at 571 (quoting authorities). The evidence in question here 
essentially showed conduct closely tied to the charged offense, 
within the same place and general time frame. Compare State v. 
DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 198-99 (Utah App. 1987) ("dope ledger" 
seized in another state from scene of charged crime held 
improperly admitted under Rule 403). It was not so remote as to 
be inadmissible under Rule 403. Next, the presence of cocaine 
residue and paraphernalia in her garbage was essentially the only 
means of identifying defendant as a knowing cocaine possessor, 
against the suggestion that her friend was the actual offender. 
Against the factors weighing in favor of admissiblity, 
it cannot be said that the evidence in question here was likely 
to provoke "overmastering hostility" against defendant. The 
evidence involved no crime "more heinous" than the one charged, 
Taylor, 818 P.2d at 572; instead, it only showed other instances 
of the same conduct. By comparison, in State v. Shickles, 760 
P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
admission of evidence that the defendant, accused only of 
kidnapping, had also sexually assaulted his victim. 
Here, then, it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its Rule 403 discretion, or violated the limits of 
reasonableness, in admitting evidence of past, recent cocaine use 
in defendant's home (T. 30)• The admission of that evidence, 
10 
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otherwise proper under the rules of evidence, should be affirmed 
on appeal. 
POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT HAD NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN HER CURBSIDE GARBAGE; THEREFORE, 
THE WARRANTLESS POLICE SEIZURE OF THE GARBAGE 
DID NOT VIOLATE THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Defendant next contends that all evidence derived from 
the warrantless seizure of her garbage should have been 
suppressed under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
That provision, like the fourth amendment to the federal 
constitution, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 
For the purpose of briefing this point, the State will 
assume that the physical evidence seized from defendant's home, 
and the inculpatory statements made by defendant during the home 
search, were the end result of an unbroken sequence of events 
that began with the seizure and inspection of her garbage. Thus 
if the garbage was seized and searched in violation of the Utah 
Constitution, both it and its derivative "fruits" presumptively 
are to be suppressed. See Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 198 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 11 (Utah Oct. 22, 1992) (Howe, Assoc. C.J., 
dissenting) (a majority of Utah Supreme Court members have held 
11 
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that a state constitution-based exclusionary rule exists).2 
Even so, defendant's argument cannot succeed. 
For police conduct to fall within the ambit of the 
fourth amendment, it must intrude upon a "reasonable expectation 
of privacy" in a given place, thing, or activity. The test of 
whether such an expectation exists is familiar, and contains two 
parts. First, the person claiming the expectation must "exhibit" 
or "manifest" it. Second, that expectation must be "objectively 
reasonable," or "legitimate" in society's view. California v. 
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1988); State 
v. Tavlor, 818 P.2d 561, 565-66 (Utah App. 1991). The same 
analysis applies under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) 
(plurality opinion). 
Defendant acknowledges that her garbage was seized 
after it had been placed out for collection at the roadside by 
her home (Br. of Appellant at 4). In denying defendant's state 
constitution-based challenge to the garbage seizure, the trial 
court, citing Greenwood, observed that under the fourth 
amendment, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in garbage 
set out for collection (R. 52). Accordingly, under federal 
constitutional law, police officers may seize curbside garbage 
2The only argument the State reserves, should this Court hold 
that the garbage seizure was improper under the Utah Constitution, 
is that inasmuch as it comported with federal law, reasonably 
relied upon by the officers, the garbage seizure could not be 
"flagrant" police misconduct, to be remedied by suppression. See 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 690-91 & n.4 (Utah 1990) (describing 
"attenuation" analysis). 
12 
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without a warrant. This is so even assuming, as the Greenwood 
Court did, that one may exhibit an expectation of privacy in such 
garbage by, for example, placing in it opaque bags. 486 U.S. at 
39, 108 S. Ct. at 1628. The Greenwood Court held that such an 
expectation is unreasonable as a matter of law, given that 
curbside garbage is "readily accessible to animals, children, 
scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." 486 U.S. 
at 40, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (footnotes omitted). 
Even on appeal, defendant mounts no cogent argument 
why, under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, Utah 
should depart from fourth amendment standards, and hold that a 
state-based reasonable expectation of privacy exists in curbside 
garbage. She does not cite Greenwood, much less show that it 
represents confusing or ill-reasoned federal precedent. Compare 
Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469 (decrying federal automobile search law 
as a confusing "labyrinth," before fashioning new rules under 
Article I, section 14), and State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-
18 (Utah 1991) (joining criticism of federal law regarding 
privacy of bank records before creating new rule under Article I, 
section 14). While independent state constitutional analysis of 
search and seizure issues may be appropriate for protection 
against "vagaries" and inconsistency in fourth amendment law, see 
State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988), defendant 
has shown no such inconsistency here. 
In fact, the fourth amendment-based Greenwood opinion 
upheld "the vast majority of lower courts," in holding that there 
13 
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is no reasonable expectation of privacy in curbside garbage. 486 
U.S. at 37, 41-43, 108 S. Ct. at 1627, 1629-30. Similarly, the 
Colorado Supreme Court, construing Colorado's constitution in a 
post-Greenwood case, has refused to find a state-based reasonable 
expectation of privacy in curbside garbage. This, the court 
stated, accords with the "great weight of authority." People v. 
Hillman, 834 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Colo. 1992). 
Again, defendant has neither cited, distinguished, nor 
identified error in the authority holding that there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy, under state or federal 
constitutions, in curbside garbage. That being the case, any 
argument she might have for an extension of Article I, section 14 
protection to such garbage has effectively been waived for lack 
of adequate briefing. See State v. Brown, No. 900148, slip op. 
at 4 n.l (Utah Nov. 30, 1992) (absent briefing of differing state 
and federal constitutional analyses, question of expanded state 
protection will not be reached). 
Further, Utah precedent weighs against a state-
protected privacy interest in curbside garbage. In State v. 
Austin, 584 P.2d 853 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a 
warrantless search that was conducted incident to a lawful 
arrest. Some of the seized items were found in the wastebasket 
of the hotel room where the arrest occurred. While upholding the 
seizures under the "plain view" and "search incident to arrest" 
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the court also stated that 
"[a] wastebasket carries an inference that anything put into it 
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is intended to be discarded or destroyed. It is not the same 
privacy interest that exists in a drawer or in a footlocker . • 
.." 584 P.2d at 857. Significantly, Austin did not purport to 
rely on the fourth amendment; instead, only Article I, section 14 
was cited. 
Here the seized garbage was no longer even in a living 
area when it was seized: it was placed curbside, for regular 
pickup. Similarly, affirming a drug possession conviction in 
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah App. 1989) (per curiam), this 
Court recited, without criticism, that marijuana found in a 
garbage can outside a residence, plus other observations, led to 
issuance of a warrant to search the residence, resulting in the 
conviction. Given Austin and Phelps, along with the authority 
from other jurisdictions, a Utah Constitution-based reasonable 
expectation of privacy in curbside garbage is a dubious legal 
suggestion. This Court may reject that suggestion outright or, 
under Brown, defer its consideration until another case when it 
is more fully briefed. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant was convicted of the charged offense upon 
properly received evidence. Accordingly, her conviction should 
be affirmed. 
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